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1 Introduction
The Covid-19 pandemic has had devastating effects on the American job market. In
April 2020, nonfarm payroll fell by 20.5 million jobs compared to March. Although there
has been some recovery in recent months, there are still 12.9 million fewer jobs as of
July compared to February 2020. The pandemic triggered a multi-trillion dollar policy
response through the passing of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security
(CARES) Act. The aggregate and distributional consequences of the pandemic and the
associated public policy response, however, are not yet fully understood.
In this paper we investigate these aggregate and distributional consequences using
data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), the official source for labor market
statistics in the U.S. By exploiting the panel structure of the CPS, we are able to
track individual-level earnings changes in order to provide a comprehensive analysis of
the impacts of the pandemic and the public policy response throughout the earnings
distribution. In particular, we are able to identify individuals who have lost employment
during the pandemic and simulate expected Unemployment Insurance (UI) payments
to estimate heterogeneity in the impact of these policies across the pre-displacement
earnings distribution. Such an analysis is not possible from cross-sectional data or from
data collected by state UI agencies on benefit recipients.
We begin by showing that weekly labor earnings per adult fell by around $95 between
February and April 2020, and have only partially recovered over more recent months.
These earnings declines translate into aggregate labor earnings losses of over $250 billion
over the course of the pandemic. Interestingly, using our matched data, we find that,
contrary to anecdotal evidence regarding pandemic-related pay increases and pay cuts,
earnings changes for individuals who remain employed during the pandemic are not
atypical during this time period. The decline in labor earnings is entirely driven by the
decline in aggregate employment.1
Job losses, however, are very unequally distributed throughout the earnings distri-
bution. The probability of transitioning out of employment is more than twice as high
for individuals who were in the lowest quintile of the earnings distribution before the
1These results are a particularly extreme example of the cyclical composition bias of wages docu-
mented by Solon et al. (1994). The literature has been equivocal about whether firms reduce wages
during downturns, as is predicted in the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model to facilitate a quick
recovery in hiring after downturns. A long literature finds evidence of both cyclical rigidity and flexi-
bility. Most recently, Gertler et al. (2020) find both new hires and continuing workers have downward
nominal wage rigidity, although Jardim et al. (2019) finds many continuing workers do receive nominal
wage cuts in administrative data, and the frequency of these cuts increases during recessions.
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onset of the pandemic, compared to those in the top quintile. Hence, while the pan-
demic led to a reduction in average labor earnings growth rates for workers who were
initially employed of around 18 percentage points overall, workers initially in the bot-
tom decile of the earnings distribution experienced a contraction of over 40 percentage
points This also implies that inequality in terms of labor earnings (before factoring in
UI payments) increased dramatically during the pandemic months.
We then proceed to analyze the extent to which the public policy response to the
pandemic was able to mitigate the overall loss in labor earnings and the associated
increase in inequality. We simulate UI (UI) benefit receipt at the individual level using
pre-displacement weekly earnings and state of residence information from the matched
CPS samples. We build off of the state UI benefit database constructed by Ganong
et al. (2020), extending the simulator to model benefits provided by the CARES Act.
We validate our simulation by contrasting our CPS-based estimates to aggregate data
on UI recipients from the Department of Labor.
Since job losses were concentrated among lower-wage workers, the pool of likely
claimants is disproportionately low-wage compared to the labor market as a whole.
Indeed, while the median weekly earnings for the sample of all workers is $765, median
earnings for workers who were displaced was $519. We show that the CARES Act was
extremely successful in raising average earnings at the bottom of the distribution, com-
pletely reversing the regressivity of the labor earnings losses induced by the pandemic
by increasing average earnings by over 50% for the bottom 10% of workers, while also
inducing small positive increases throughout the rest of the distribution. However, this
obscures substantial heterogeneity in UI eligibility, with the bulk of workers who are
predicted to be ineligible for UI or CARES benefits concentrated in the bottom deciles
of the pre-pandemic earnings distribution.
Using data on actual UI payments from the Department of Labor, we find that $263
billion has been paid out as of the end of July 2020. Comparing this to our estimate
of total pandemic-associated wage losses of $254 billion, this implies that the CARES
Act led to excess payments of $9 billion by the end of July. Nonetheless, we find
that these payments are concentrated among workers who were low earners before the
pandemic, with the bottom third of pre-pandemic earners receiving 49% of the total
payments. Baker et al. (2020) examine consumption behavior from the stimulus checks
which were a part of the CARES Act, finding 30% of stimulus payments were spent
within the month, with lower-income individuals driving consumption behavior. Thus,
it is likely that the additional UI payments served as crucial additional stimulus to
3
aggregate demand during the early months of the Covid-19 recession.
It has been well documented that past recessions lead to a rise in wage-based income
inequality (see for instance Perri & Steinberg (2012)). However, in the Great Recession,
consumption inequality actually fell (Meyer & Sullivan, 2013; Perri & Steinberg, 2012),
suggesting that government transfers can mitigate recessionary wage-income losses. In
the Covid recession, Cox et al. (2020) use bank account data to show that spend-
ing fell for all income groups in March, but had rebounded by April for the lowest
income groups.2 Since these low-income individuals are disproportionately likely to
have lost their jobs (see Cortes & Forsythe, 2020), this strongly suggests that UI and
the Economic Impact Payments checks (distributed beginning April 13th) successfully
preserved consumption among these groups.
A rapid literature has developed studying the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic and
the CARES Act on the labor market. We highlight a few closely related papers here.
Using data from ADP (a large U.S. payroll processing company), and consistent with
our results, Cajner et al. (2020) find that lower-wage workers were disproportionately
likely to lose employment during the pandemic, and that this composition effect drives
the increase in average wages in the cross-section. Early work on the impact of the
CARES Act by Ganong et al. (2020) using data from 2019 emphasized how the UI
expansion would increase wage replacement rates above 100% for many potential UI
recipients.3 This raised the concern that the benefit enhancements may have led to
a search disincentive for recipients. However, so far there has been little evidence of
this channel, with Marinescu et al. (2020) finding applications-per-vacancy increased
on Glassdoor.com during the crisis. Looking at cross-state differences in the average UI
replacement rate, Dube (2020) finds no evidence that states with a higher replacement
rate had lower employment, while in fact Bartik et al. (2020) find a smaller decline in
employment and a faster recovery for small businesses.4
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first paper to estimate the impact of the
pandemic and the CARES Act on earnings and inequality using nationally representa-
tive longitudinal data covering the pandemic period.
2See also Chetty et al. (2020).
3Ganong et al. (2020) use 2019 ASEC data to estimate replacement rates from the CARES Act
across all workers. In contrast, we use individual-level data on job separations from the matched CPS
samples in order to identify the impacts among individuals who actually lost employment during the
pandemic.
4See also Altonji et al. (2020).
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2 Data and Methodology
Our analysis uses data from the monthly Current Population Survey (CPS), re-
trieved from the IPUMS repository (Flood et al., 2020). The CPS has a rotating panel
structure, whereby households are surveyed for four consecutive months, then leave the
sample for eight months, and are then surveyed for another four consecutive months.
To reduce the burden of response, the CPS only collects earnings information during
individuals’ 4th and 8th months in the sample. The dataset therefore provides earnings
information at up to two points in time for every individual, with the two observations
being one year apart. We take advantage of this rotating structure in our analysis and
track individuals’ employment status and earnings over time. We match individuals
across CPS samples following Madrian & Lefgren (1999).
We restrict our analysis to non-institutionalized civilians aged 16 and older. Most
specifications use data from January 2015 through July 2020. The CPS survey is
conducted in the week containing the 12th of each month. During the pandemic period,
the CPS reported an unusually large number of individuals who were absent from work
for unspecified reasons, which the CPS has indicated are better classified as being on
temporary layoff.5 However, nearly one-quarter of individuals who were absent for
“other” reasons in April 2020 report being paid by their employer for their time off.
We therefore only re-assign individuals as being on temporary layoff if they appear in
the survey as being employed but are absent from work for unspecified reasons, and
report that they were not paid by their employer for their time off. This adjustment
makes little difference in pre-pandemic periods but decreases the employment rate by
nearly 2.5 percentage points in April 2020 (see Cortes & Forsythe, 2020).
Our primary measure of labor earnings is usual weekly earnings at the current job,
before deductions. We convert earnings in all periods to real June 2020 dollars using
the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Following
Lemieux (2006), we adjust top-coded earnings by a factor of 1.4. We also winsorize the
lowest 1% of earnings. We weight individuals using the relevant individual weights for
those in the earnings sample (EARNWT in IPUMS).
To understand the impact of the pandemic along the earnings distribution, we clas-
sify individuals into ventiles (bins containing 5% of workers). Due to noisiness at the
tails, we do not sub-divide workers in the bottom or the top decile of the distribution.
When analyzing within-individual year-on-year changes across the distribution, we al-
5See https://www.bls.gov/cps/employment-situation-covid19-faq-april-2020.pdf
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locate individuals to ventiles based on their position in the earnings distribution in the
initial period, but weight them according to their current period weights.6
In order to isolate the impact of the pandemic from seasonal and annual patterns
we implement a regression approach. For outcomes aggregated to the monthly level,







t + εt (1)
where Yt is the outcome variable of interest in period t (e.g. the change in average
earnings between month t and month t − 12), γmt is a set of calendar month fixed
effects, capturing any seasonal patterns in the outcome variable, and αyt is a set of year
fixed effects. DCt is an indicator for the Covid-19 pandemic months – either a vector
of dummies for March, April, May, June, and July 2020, or a single dummy pooling
these months.7 Our coefficient of interest, β, captures deviations in our outcome of
interest during the pandemic months, once seasonal effects and annual patterns have
been accounted for.
We analyze the impacts of the pandemic along the earnings distribution following
a similar regression approach, but using the individual-level data directly and allowing







t + εit (2)
Here, our outcome variable of interest Yit will be a measure of within-individual year-
on-year earnings changes (i.e. between month t − 12 and month t). Our sample will
therefore be constituted by individuals who were employed and had non-missing earn-
ings in month t− 12. p represents the ventile that individual i belongs to (based on his
or her position in the earnings distribution in t − 12). γmpt and α
y
pt are fully interacted
ventile-month and ventile-year fixed effects, respectively. Depending on the outcome
of interest, we either condition on individuals who are also employed in period t or
we include individuals who transition out of employment between t − 12 and t. In
such cases, we measure earnings changes in percentage terms (rather than log changes),
with individuals who are not employed in period t experiencing an earnings change of
6This is particularly important during the pandemic period due to the increased incidence of
non-response.
7The CPS survey in March took place just as the initial impacts of the pandemic were manifesting
themselves in the U.S. economy; hence, as seen below, the impacts observed in March are quite muted
compared to those observed in subsequent months.
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-100%.8
Our analysis of the public policy response to the pandemic builds on the UI simulator
of Ganong et al. (2020) and also uses information from the 2019 American Community
Survey (ACS), as discussed in detail in Section 4.
3 Changes in Earnings during the Pandemic
3.1 Impact on Average Earnings
Figure 1 displays the evolution of earnings over time. Panel A shows average real
weekly earnings among workers in each cross-section. As has been widely documented,
average earnings increased substantially between February and May 2020 (from around
$1,100 to $1,190) and remain much higher than in the pre-pandemic period. Naturally,
this does not translate into higher aggregate labor earnings, given that employment
fell dramatically during this time period. As Panel B shows, weekly labor earnings per
adult fell substantially at the onset of the pandemic, from around $670 in February to
around $575 in April, with only a partial recovery thereafter.
The cross-sectional increase in average earnings observed in Panel A of Figure 1
is of course affected by changes in the composition of the workforce due to the large
employment contraction at the onset of the pandemic. By exploiting the rotating panel
structure of the CPS, we are able to track within-individual changes in earnings in
order to determine whether the cross-sectional increase in average earnings is entirely
composition driven, or whether it also reflects earnings increases among individuals who
remain employed, perhaps because of increases in hazard pay due to the pandemic.9
The solid blue line in Panel A of Figure 2 presents raw year-on-year changes in
average log real weekly earnings in the cross-section, reflecting the pattern observed
in Panel A of Figure 1. The dashed red line, meanwhile, computes average within-
individual year-on-year changes in log real earnings for individuals who remain em-
ployed. If we consider the patterns typically observed before the pandemic, we see that
8Alternatively, we could replace zeros with a small positive value in order to continue working with
log earnings. However, given how widespread the job losses have been during the pandemic period,
the assumed small positive value is not innocuous and can substantially skew the average earnings
changes along the distribution.




earnings growth tends to be higher than in the cross-section when following individu-
als who remain employed. This is because it is a selected sample with stronger labor
market attachment. Remarkably, this series remains very stable during the pandemic
months. Conditional on remaining employed, earnings changes during the pandemic
months were not atypical on average. This implies that the observed increase in mean
earnings in the solid blue line is entirely driven by changes in the composition of the
workforce.10
Panel B of Figure 2 isolates the impact of the pandemic by implementing the re-
gression approach in Equation (1). The blue and red bars use the same variables as in
Panel A. The figure plots the estimated coefficients for the monthly pandemic-month
dummies, which capture the year-on-year impacts of the pandemic in each month, after
controlling for seasonal and annual time effects. The estimated coefficients confirm the
substantial and significant increase in mean earnings in the cross-section, and the lack
of significant changes in earnings growth among individuals who remain employed.
The green bars in Panel B are based on a specification where the dependent vari-
able is the average within-individual percentage change in real earnings, including in-
dividuals whose labor earnings fall to zero due to exit from employment.11 When
considering all individuals who were initially employed, including those who exit to
non-employment, we observe a dramatic decrease in the average earnings growth rate
during the pandemic months – around 18 percentage points year-on-year in April, and
around 14 percentage points in May and June. Hence, the increased incidence of job
loss led to a dramatic decrease in labor earnings among individuals who were employed
in the pre-pandemic period (in line with the decline in earnings per adult documented
in Panel B of Figure 1).12
10This result is consistent with the finding of Cajner et al. (2020), who conduct a similar analysis
using payroll data from ADP.
11Note that the dependent variables for the blue and red bars are based on changes in log earnings,
rather than percentage changes. Results, however, are nearly identical if we use percentage changes
for all specifications.
12As we show in Cortes & Forsythe (2020), the vast majority of the decline in employment during
the pandemic is driven by an increase in the job separation rate; the decline in the job finding rate
is comparatively small. Hence, most of the earnings impact of the pandemic would be felt among
individuals who were initially employed.
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3.2 Distributional Impacts
We now turn to the distributional impacts of the pandemic. Figure 3 shows that the
distribution of earnings among those who are employed in the cross-section not only
shifted upwards, but also became much more compressed, with much larger increases
in earnings observed at lower percentiles of the distribution, particularly over the 12-
month periods to April and May 2020. For reference, the light grey lines at the bottom
of the graph indicate the analogous changes over earlier 12-month periods, confirming
that this compression is a feature observed only during the early onset of the pandemic.
As with average wages in the cross-section, the distributional changes in Figure 3
are affected by changes in the composition of workers during the pandemic. In Figure 4
we explore the impacts of the pandemic throughout the earnings distribution, focusing
on individuals who were employed prior to the pandemic and tracking their outcomes
over time, hence accounting for compositional changes. As discussed in Section 2, we
isolate the impact of the pandemic throughout the earnings distribution by estimating
Equation (2) using individual-level data. The regression incorporates fully interacted
ventile-month and ventile-year fixed effects, which allow seasonal and annual patterns
to be heterogeneous along the distribution.
Panel A of Figure 4 shows the impact of the pandemic on labor earnings for each
percentile bin. A clear pattern emerges: individuals who start off with lower weekly
earnings experience dramatically larger declines in their labor income – as high as 38%
for individuals in the bottom decile of the distribution.
These changes in earnings may arise because of an extensive margin effect, i.e. a
change in the probability of being employed and having any labor earnings, and an
intensive margin effect, i.e. a change in earnings conditional on remaining employed.
Panels B and C separate these two effects. Consistent with our results regarding the
impact of the pandemic on average earnings in Figure 2, we find that the impacts of
the pandemic along the earnings distribution are driven exclusively by the extensive
margin effect. In particular, Panel B of Figure 4 shows that employment losses were
much more severe for workers in the lower part of the earnings distribution. While
employment probabilities decline by less than 4 percentage points for workers in the
top decile of the pre-pandemic earnings distribution, the decline is around 20 percentage
points for workers in the bottom decile. This explains the cross-sectional increase in
average earnings and the cross-sectional compression of earnings inequality documented
in Figures 1 and 3.
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Meanwhile, for workers who remain employed, the pandemic does not have a sta-
tistically significant impact on earnings, as shown in Panel C of Figure 4. In other
words, earnings growth was not atypical for workers who remain employed during the
pandemic months, regardless of their initial position in the earnings distribution. Some
positive earnings impacts are observed for workers in the lower and middle parts of
the distribution, but these are imprecisely estimated. Appendix Figure A.1 confirms
that the lack of significant average changes within each percentile bin does not hide in-
creased propensities of experiencing either earnings increases or earnings declines. The
figure shows that the probability of experiencing a decrease (increase) in individual-
level nominal weekly earnings of more than $10 is not systematically impacted by the
pandemic. This suggests that reductions in hourly earnings or in paid hours of work
have not been widespread among individuals who are still in employment during the
pandemic months. Earnings increases for workers who remain employed (who may face
an increased risk of exposure to disease) also do not appear to be widespread.13,14
Overall, we can conclude that the increase in mean earnings and the reduction in
inequality observed in the aggregate data in Figures 1 and 3 are entirely composition
driven, due to the exit of low earners from employment. If we track individuals who were
employed in 2019, we see that the pandemic had the effect of dramatically reducing labor
earnings and increasing inequality among these workers. In what follows we analyze
the extent to which these negative impacts were mitigated by the public policy response
to the pandemic.
4 The Role of Public Policy
The key public policy instrument in the United States to insure against unexpected
labor earnings losses is the UI system. Each state has its own requirements and benefit
levels. Eligibility typically depends on reaching an earnings threshold before displace-
13We find that the entire overall distribution of within-individual year-on-year earnings changes
is not very different during the pandemic months compared to the same calendar months in pre-
pandemic years, suggesting no evidence of increased dispersion in wage changes among those who
remain employed. Results are available from the authors upon request.
14Using payroll data from ADP, Cajner et al. (2020) find that, when they focus on the firms that
typically adjust wages in March, April, or May, there is a 20 percentage point increase in wage freezes
and a 12 percentage point increase in wage cuts. These firms, however, represent only around 10% of
the businesses in the ADP sample who continuously employed workers during all of 2019 and the first
half of 2020. Our results suggest that these patterns are not sufficiently widespread to be detectable
in nationally representative data.
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ment; however, many states also require minimum earnings in more than one quarter,
as well as other requirements.
In response to the growing economic threat from the Covid-19 pandemic, the CARES
Act was signed into law on March 27th 2020. This extended UI benefits in three ways.
First, the CARES Act created a new benefit called Pandemic Unemployment Assistance
(PUA), which expands the eligibility universe to individuals who are not typically eligi-
ble for UI, including the self-employed, as well as individuals whose earnings or number
of weeks worked were too low. Benefits for individuals receiving PUA payments are
calculated in the same way as for standard UI recipients, with the exception that the
minimum benefit floor is higher, equal to half of the average benefit in the state.15
Second, the CARES Act created a new program called Pandemic Unemployment Com-
pensation (PUC), which provided a $600 weekly UI top-up for all UI recipients. Third,
the CARES Act extended the maximum duration of benefits by 13 weeks with the Pan-
demic Emergency Unemployment Compensation (PEUC). The PUA and PEUC are in
place until the end of December 2020. PUC payments, however, expired on July 31st.
Below we discuss how we simulate UI benefits received during the pandemic using
our matched CPS samples, and how these payments impacted the overall level and
distribution of earnings among workers who were employed before the onset of the
pandemic.
4.1 Simulating Unemployment Insurance Benefits
The CPS does not collect information on whether an individual is receiving UI
benefits. We are, however, able to simulate the benefits that individuals should be
eligible to receive using information on their state of residence and their weekly earnings
reported in the pre-displacement period. We do this by building on the UI simulator
constructed by Ganong et al. (2020).
As above, we focus on individuals observed in month-in-sample 8 who were employed
(and had non-missing earnings) in month-in-sample 4 (i.e. one year prior). This ensures
that we have a wage observation from which to calculate eligibility and benefits. To be
eligible for UI or the CARES Act, an individual generally needs to have been employed
and involuntarily lost their job. We can identify individuals who are likely to be eligible
for UI or the CARES Act by taking advantage of the panel dimension of the CPS as well
as using information on unemployment spell lengths and the reason for unemployment.
15See https://oui.doleta.gov/dmstree/uipl/uipl2k20/uipl_0320.pdf.
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Pre-pandemic, we identify individuals as eligible for UI if they were employed one
year prior, are currently involuntarily unemployed, and the duration of unemployment
is less than the maximum benefit duration of 26 weeks. We also classify individuals as
eligible if they are currently employed but absent from work and unpaid.
This approach identifies individuals who are plausibly eligible for UI, though it will
miss individuals who may claim UI but are classified as being out of the labor force
by the CPS. Pre-pandemic, this is not of major concern. During the pandemic period,
however, there was a substantial increase in flows from employment to non-participation
in the CPS (see Cortes & Forsythe, 2020). Most of these individuals likely qualify for
UI, but are classified as not-in-the-labor-force because they are not actively searching
for work. Thus, we expand our UI eligibility definition beginning in April 2020. In
addition to individuals who satisfy our pre-pandemic eligibility criteria, we also deem
individuals to be eligible for UI if they are not employed in the current period but
were employed at any point in the last three months (i.e. when they were in month-
in-sample 5, 6, or 7), regardless of whether they are currently classified as unemployed
or out of the labor force in the CPS.16 In addition, we deem individuals eligible if they
are classified as unemployed and have an unemployment spell that started on or after
March 1st 2020, regardless of their reported reason for unemployment.
We simulate three layers of UI benefits, based on recent public policy. First, we es-
timate individuals’ expected weekly standard UI benefit, building on the UI simulator
of Ganong et al. (2020), which is based on UI guidance provided by the Department of
Labor.17 The simulator generates estimated unemployment benefits based on individ-
uals’ state of residence and pre-displacement quarterly earnings. Since information on
the number of weeks worked per quarter is not available in the monthly CPS, we use in-
formation from the 2019 American Community Survey (ACS). Specifically, in the ACS
data, we classify individuals into earnings ventiles as we do in the CPS, and compute
the fraction in each ventile-state cell that are above the state’s weeks worked threshold
for eligibility, and the average number of weeks worked conditional on being above the
threshold. We calculate this separately for regular employees and self-employed individ-
uals. We then compute expected individual-level unemployment benefits as the product
of the probability of being above the weeks worked threshold and the expected weekly
16In Appendix Figure A.2 we show that employment losses during the onset of the pandemic are
concentrated among individuals who were employed in the last three months. This supports our focus
on these individuals as potential UI recipients.
17See https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/content/sigpros/2020-2029/January2020.pdf.
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standard UI benefit from the simulator conditional on being above the threshold. Note
that the inputs for the simulator are the individual’s observed weekly earnings and state
of residence from the CPS, as well as the average weeks worked for individuals above
the threshold in the same percentile bin and state from the ACS. Some individuals will
have zero expected standard UI benefits due to low earnings. Individuals who report
being self-employed are also excluded from eligibility for standard UI.18
Second, we simulate the expanded eligibility from the PUA provision in the CARES
Act. PUA recipients include individuals who are self-employed, and those that do not
qualify for standard UI because their earnings are too low or they did not work enough
weeks of the prior year to qualify. PUA benefits are based on the same formula as the
state’s standard benefits; however, earnings minimums and weeks worked requirements
are waived. In addition, there is a weekly benefit floor defined for each state, which is
calculated as half of the average weekly benefit paid by the state. For individuals whose
expected standard UI benefits would be zero due to earnings being too low, we set PUA
benefits equal to the weekly benefit floor in their state. For other individuals who were
not self-employed, we compute the expected benefits as above, and add the probability
of being below the weeks worked threshold multiplied by the weekly benefit floor in the
individual’s state. For the self-employed, we compute their predicted PUA payments
as the maximum between their predicted UI benefits using the UI simulator (based
on their individual earnings and state of residence from the CPS, along with imputed
weeks worked from the ACS) and the PUA benefit floor in their state of residence.
Third, we add in the $600 PUC benefit to all UI recipients identified as eligible for
the standard UI or PUA UI benefits.
There are several caveats to our approach. First, we do not observe whether individ-
uals meet other requirements for eligibility, such as employment by a covered employer
and being discharged rather than quitting. We may incorrectly label some individuals
as UI eligible if they retired or otherwise left the labor market.19 Conversely, we would
omit individuals who happened to not be employed in the reference week a year prior,
but are otherwise eligible. Second, we do not know if the individual actually claimed
UI. Bitler et al. (2020) find that during the pandemic, only 42% of unemployed individ-
uals with a high school degree or less were receiving unemployment benefits, compared
with 52% of those with a college degree. Although we do not know if this gap is due
18We measure self-employment by status in the most recent month worked.
19We do not define eligibility on whether or not the worker reports being retired or disabled, because
they could still claim UI even if they do not intend to return to employment.
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to eligibility or claiming behavior, this suggests that lower-income workers may be less
likely to claim even when eligible. Finally, we do not observe whether individuals are
undocumented immigrants, who are ineligible to receive UI benefits. Bitler et al. (2020)
estimate 4% of workers are undocumented, and these individuals are more likely to be
low-wage workers.
In order to assess the reliability of our estimates, in the next section we compare
our estimated claims and payments with data from the Department of Labor.
4.2 Benchmarking to Department of Labor Data
We begin by comparing the characteristics of predicted UI claimants from the CPS
data during the pandemic period to the characteristics of actual UI recipients provided
by states to the Department of Labor (DoL).20 As shown in Appendix Table A.1, the
share of women and Hispanics are similar. The CPS data, however, predicts a smaller
share of black claimants than in the UI data (12% vs 21%). There are also some
differences in the age distribution, with a higher share of workers 55 and up in the CPS
data compared with actual recipients (30% versus 22%). This suggests that we may be
classifying some retirees as potential UI claimants. Finally, the industry distribution
is similar between the two data sources. Overall, while we cannot know if a particular
individual claims UI, the characteristics of our predicted claimants is quite similar to
that of actual UI recipients.
Next, we compare the total estimated number of claimants and payments. There
has been a variety of issues with states reporting data on UI recipients, leading to large
over-counts in the number of claims. Thus, we instead use data on actual weeks of
claims paid and the total amount paid through the two main programs: the standard
UI, and the PUA program.21 Unfortunately, the PUA data remains incomplete, with
about 20 states each month failing to report.
We begin by comparing the number of estimated UI claimants in the CPS with
actual UI claims paid from March through July 2020 in Panel A of Table 1. To do
this, we first compute total outflows from employment (in person-months) in the CPS
by multiplying the year-on-year outflow rate with employment in the corresponding
month in 2019. This gives us total job separations of 136 million (or approximately 30
20The DoL data is derived from ETA 203 reports submitted monthly by states, and covers the
period up to June 2020.
21These numbers are reported monthly by each state UI system on forms ETA5159 and ETA902p.
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million per month). Many of these job separations would have occurred naturally even
in the absence of the pandemic, due to normal rates of firings, quits, and retirements,
for example. In order to estimate the number of pandemic-induced job separations,
we estimate Equation (1) using the year-on-year job separation rate as the dependent
variable. The estimated coefficients are displayed in Appendix Figure A.3. We use these
estimates for the excess job losses during the pandemic to construct the total number of
pandemic-induced person-month job separations. As shown in Table 1, these amount
to 71 million.
This group of individuals who have left employment can be divided into three groups:
those we predict to be eligible for standard UI (75 million person-months), those we
predict to be eligible for PUA (20 million), and those we predict not to be eligible for
either program (41 million). We estimate that the pandemic led to an increase in 70
million separators who are eligible for standard UI. We also find that the number of
ineligible job separators fell by 20.6 million person-months during the pandemic. This is
slightly smaller than our estimate for the total PUA claims of 20.1 million, suggesting
that the vast majority of the decline in ineligible separations is associated with the
expansion of eligibility provided by the PUA program.
The columns on the right of Table 1 display the actual number of claims paid
through each of these programs (as well as the PEUC), with the caveat that this is an
undercount of the PUA program due to state non-reporting.
The total number of individual-months we estimate are eligible for standard UI are
75 million, compared to 66 million who have received benefits through either standard
UI or the PEUC, which extends the duration of standard UI. Comparing the PUA
numbers, we see that we predict 20 million person-months are eligible for PUA, while
at least 25 million have received these benefits. These discrepancies may be related to
the caveats of our approach discussed above, which does not perfectly predict eligibility.
Moreover, some of the individuals who we predicted would be eligible for standard UI
may not have been eligible and hence gone through the PUA program instead. The
DoL UI numbers may also be imprecise due to processing or reporting delays. Overall,
however, our total estimate of 94.65 million person-month eligible claimants from the
CPS is not far off from the 90.31 million person-month claims that have actually been
reported as paid.
In Panel B of Table 1, we tally the total dollars in benefits we predict have been
received by claimants, and compare these to the amounts that have actually been paid,
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according to DoL data.22 Although the data on the $600 PUC payments have not yet
been released, we assume that all standard UI, PEUC, and PUA recipients receive this
benefit from April through July. This yields a total of $263 billion in actual benefits
paid between March and July 2020. In contrast, we calculate that $300 billion would
have been paid if all individuals we predicted would be eligible were able to receive
benefits. This amounts to a 12% underpayment rate.
We can compare the total payments made through the different UI programs to the
total volume of labor earnings losses experienced during the pandemic months. Panel
C of Table 1 shows that the total year-on-year change in aggregate labor earnings
between March and July amounted to $124 billion.23 This raw change, however, is an
under-estimate of the impact of the pandemic if one considers the fact that aggregate
labor earnings would have normally been expected to increase during this time period,
due to normal rates of population, employment, and wage growth. If we once again
implement the approach of estimating Equation (1), now using aggregate labor earnings
as the dependent variable, we can obtain estimates of the impact of the pandemic in
each month. Aggregating these monthly impacts, we estimate total pandemic-induced
labor earnings losses to be $254 billion. Comparing this number to the total UI benefit
payments made during this time period, we see that the total benefits paid were $9
billion more than the pandemic-associated earnings loss.
Below we analyze how these UI payments impacted earnings growth across indi-
viduals, on average and according to their initial position in the earnings distribution.
We show results based on our benchmark eligibility simulation, corresponding to the
left-hand columns of Table 1. We also use the gap between our simulated eligibility
figures and the DoL data in order to provide estimates that match the information on
actual claims paid. In particular, based on the information in Panel A of Table 1, and
in order to match the number of claims from the DoL data, we assume that individuals
that we predict to be eligible for standard UI in the CPS have a 6% probability of
receiving PUA instead, and a 6% probability of receiving no benefits at all.
22We aggregate predicted weekly benefits in the CPS to the monthly level by assuming that an
individual who we deem to be eligible for UI during the CPS reference week would claim unemployment
benefits during all weeks in that month.
23This amount is obtained by multiplying year-on-year changes in aggregate weekly earnings by the
number of weeks per month, and adding up the total obtained for the five pandemic months (March
through July).
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4.3 Effect of UI Policies on Average Earnings
Figure 5 shows how standard UI, the PUA, and the PUC affect average within-
individual earnings growth. As we saw in Figure 2, individuals employed before the
pandemic experienced a 18 percentage points decrease in their weekly labor earnings
growth rate in April; the year-on-year decline was smaller, at 7 percentage points, by
July. Here we see that standard UI is able to counteract only a portion of these earnings
losses, with average losses of 13percentage points in April and 3percentage points by
July. By expanding eligibility, PUA was able to shrink the average losses to 7 percent-
age points in April. Finally, the full CARES Act, which combines standard UI, PUA
expanded eligibility, and the PUC additional $600 payments would have successfully
increased average earnings growth rates by 26 percentage points in April and 17 per-
centage points in July, if all individuals that we estimate to be eligible had claimed and
received payment. The final set of bars in Figure 5, which is our preferred specification
regarding actual benefits paid, adjusts benefits based on the gap between our estimates
and the DoL payment data. This adjustment cuts the earnings increases, leading to a
24 percentage points increase in the earnings growth rate in April, 19 percentage points
in May, 13 percentage points in June, and 16 percentage points in July.24
4.4 Effect of UI Policies by Pre-Pandemic Wage Percentile
Next we want to understand the distributional impacts of these policies. Recall
from Figure 4 that the pandemic-induced declines in employment that disproportion-
ately affected individuals in the bottom half of the pre-pandemic earnings distribution.
Further, eligibility for UI varies dramatically across the earnings distribution. In Ap-
pendix Figure A.5, we show that individuals who were in low-earning jobs before the
pandemic are much less likely to be employed during the pandemic months, and much
more likely to be ineligible for any UI programs, compared to individuals who were in
higher-earning jobs. Almost one quarter of pandemic job-losers in the bottom 10% of
the earnings distribution would not qualify for their state’s standard UI program, but
do qualify for the PUA. Thus, the expansion of UI eligibility from the CARES Act
primarily increased access to UI for low-income workers.25
In Figure 6, we combine the estimates for March through July 2020 from Figure
24In Appendix Figure A.4 we show the level changes in earnings.
25Appendix Figure A.6 provides information on the reasons for ineligibility for displaced workers
from each earnings decile.
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5, but look at the effect across ventiles in the previous year’s distribution of weekly
labor earnings. As in Figure 4, we estimate the change in the earnings growth rate
during the pandemic months, after controlling for year and month fixed effects, using
the regression approach in Equation (2).
In the top left panel of Figure 6 we show the impacts on earnings growth rates
during the pandemic months after factoring in baseline simulated UI benefits, before
the CARES Act provisions. Here we see that the UI system does a modest job of
replacing lost income. Without UI, the bottom third of the income distribution would
have their weekly earnings growth rate fall by more than 15 percentage points; with
standard UI, this reduction is halved. Nonetheless, we see that these UI benefits are
not enough to counteract the increased regressivity in the earnings distribution induced
by pandemic job loss.
We next add the PUA benefits, shown in the top right of Figure 6. This primarily
increases benefits to individuals at the bottom of the wage distribution, who do not have
sufficient earnings or quarters of employment to qualify for their state’s UI program.
Nonetheless, earnings losses remain larger at the bottom of the wage distribution, and
almost all ventiles have average losses.
In the bottom left panel of Figure 6, we add in the extra $600 per week PUC pro-
gram. Here we see earnings changes are positive throughout the bottom half of the
distribution, and close to zero in the top half. As discussed above, however, this base-
line estimation overestimates the number of individuals receiving benefits, relative to
the DoL numbers. Thus, in the bottom right panel, we provide the estimates adjusted
for the fraction that actually received UI payments. Note that we do not know where
in the wage distribution these non-claimants fell, and we thus apply the transforma-
tion uniformly. Although most ventiles show small positive earnings increases, these
increases are concentrated in the bottom of the distribution, with the bottom quarter
receiving average weekly earnings growth rate increases of 20 percentage points or more.
It is important to emphasize that, although these policies led to larger earnings
replacement rates at the bottom of the distribution, when we look at level changes in
earnings (rather than percentage changes), losses and benefits are much more uniform.
These results can be found in Appendix Figure A.7.
To put these numbers in context, in Figure 7 we compare weekly earnings and
benefit amounts along the earnings distribution. In the top panel, we compare the
weekly earning levels across deciles for all individuals employed during the pre-pandemic
period (blue bars) and those that lost employment (red bars). As a consequence of the
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fact that job loss was concentrated in low earning workers, here we see that while the
previous year’s median wage of the potentially displaced set (i.e. across all workers) is
$765, for the actually displaced the median wage was $519.
In the bottom graph, we restrict our analysis to these workers that were displaced
during the pandemic, and again estimate the average benefit under various UI pro-
visions. The red bars reproduce the earnings levels across deciles for these displaced
workers, as shown in the top panel. The gray bars show the average benefits under
standard UI. The lowest earning third would receive weekly benefits of under $200 per
week. For the whole distribution, average standard UI benefits max out at approxi-
mately $480 per week.
The green bars show the estimated average benefit with expanded eligibility under
the CARES Act, through the PUA program. As mentioned above, this primarily helps
the bottom of the wage distribution, who have a high rate of ineligibility for standard
UI. Given the minimum payments, this brings up average benefits to above-average
wage losses for the bottom decile of displaced workers.
Finally, the yellow bars estimate the total benefits from the CARES Act, which
adds the additional $600 per week on top of the benefits in the green bar. Here we see
that total benefits are higher than earnings for 80% of displaced workers; however, note
that these workers are displaced from jobs in the bottom 60% of the pre-displacement
earnings distribution.
4.5 Discussion
The CARES Act, and in particular the $600 PUC payments, ended up providing
more economic stimulus than as initially conceived. The $600 figure was chosen to
provide the median full-time earner a 100% replacement rate when combined with
standard UI replacement rates of about 40%.26 However, the policy overshot for two
reasons. First, the median weekly pay in 2019 was only $765, because many workers
do not work full time. This would push the median replacement rate to 118%. Even
more importantly, pandemic job loss was concentrated among low-earning individuals,
with median weekly earnings of job losers of only $519. The median job loser has a
projected replacement rate of 156%. In Appendix Figure A.8, we show how benefits are
distributed across deciles of the pre-displacement earnings distribution. Almost half of
the benefits go to the bottom-earning one-third of workers.
26See https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/08/06/600-dollar-unemployment-benefit/
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As we estimated above, CARES Act payments (in conjunction with standard UI
payments) exceeded total pandemic earnings losses by $9 billion. This amounts to less
than 3% of the Economic Impact Payments (EIP) in the CARES Act, which took the
form of payments of $1200 per adult and $500 per child. Baker et al. (2020) found these
direct payments led to a strong spending response, concentrated among people with
low account balances, low earnings, and large income drops, concluding that targeting
stimulus to households with low levels of liquidity will have the largest fiscal multipliers.
In particular, they find multipliers of 0.33 for individuals who earn under $1000 per
month, which comprise 20% of our sample of separators and who received replacement
rates of over 300%. In contrast, they find the lowest fiscal multipliers for individuals
who earn over $3000 per month, which corresponds to the top 20% of separators,
and coincidentally are the only group who face replacement rates below 100%. In
addition, they find larger multipliers for households experiencing earnings drops. Thus,
by expanding UI beyond the replacement rates for displaced low earners, the targeted
aid provided by the CARES Act may have had a stronger fiscal multiplier than the
EIP stimulus checks. Moreover, the combination of the EIP stimulus payments and the
CARES benefit expansion was likely responsible for the remarkable finding from Han
et al. (2020) that poverty rates have fallen during the pandemic.
Nonetheless, we estimate that around 5% of individuals that we predict to be eligible
for UI or PUA did not receive benefits. Further, about 30% of individuals who lost
employment during the pandemic period do not meet our screen for UI eligibility. These
workers are much more likely to be low-earning, and hence in most need for stimulus
payments. Thus, although the PUA and PUC were very successful in replacing income
and increasing consumption for recipients, many individuals were ineligible for this aid.
5 Conclusions
The Covid-19 pandemic has had a dramatic impact on the U.S. labor market. By
exploiting the rotating nature of the CPS samples, we provide an account of the impact
of the pandemic and the associated public policy response on earnings, focusing on a
consistent and nationally representative sample of workers who were employed before
the onset of the pandemic.
We find that low-earning individuals were disproportionately likely to lose their
jobs during the pandemic. In the absence of the public policy response through the
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CARES Act, earnings inequality would have experienced a dramatic increase. The PUA
and PUC provisions of the CARES Act were able to offset these impacts. The PUA
UI eligibility expansion primarily benefited low-income workers, while the $600 PUC
payments led to a larger percentage increase in income for individuals in the bottom
third of the wage distribution. Given consumption patterns of low-income individuals,
this likely produced a substantial fiscal multiplier, helping to reduce the fall in aggregate
demand from the recession.
On August 1st, 2020, the $600 PUC benefits expired, while UI claims remain his-
torically large.27 If the PUC benefits had not been available in July, on average work-
ers would have experienced decreases in weekly earnings growth rates of 3 percentage
points, compared with the increases of 11 percentage points they actually received.
This would amount to a total loss of $15 billion, with workers in the bottom third of
the earnings distribution absorbing nearly half of this loss. These workers, who earned
less than $500 a week before the pandemic, are less likely to have savings and other
income sources to weather a sustained loss in income. Thus, not only was the loss of
benefits personally disastrous for many individuals, it also cut off an important source
of aggregate demand while the economy remains in the depths of the worst recession
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Figure 1: Evolution of Real Weekly Earnings
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Note: The figure is based on CPS data on usual earnings in the current job, converted to June 2020
dollars. Following Lemieux (2006), top-coded earnings are adjusted by a factor of 1.4. The lowest 1%
of earnings are winsorized.
24
Figure 2: Changes in Mean Earnings: Overall vs Within Individuals

























2016m1 2017m1 2018m1 2019m1 2020m1
Cross−Section Remain Employed
 










Mar 2020 Apr 2020 May 2020 Jun 2020 Jul 2020
Cross−Section Remain Employed Initially Empl
Note: Panel A plots changes in average log real weekly earnings in the cross-section of workers in the
solid blue line, and among workers who remain employed (with non-missing earnings) in the dashed
red line. Panel B plots the estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from Equation (1) using
monthly data on year-on-year changes since January 2015 (55 observations). The coefficients capture
the effects of the pandemic after controlling for seasonal and year effects. The dependent variables
for the “Cross-Section” and the “Remain Employed” specifications are the series from Panel A. The
dependent variable for “Initially Empl” is the average within-individual percentage change in earnings
for all individuals who were employed (and have non-missing earnings) one year earlier, including those
who transition out of employment.
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Note: The figure plots the year-on-year changes in real weekly earnings at each percentile, based on
cross-sectional CPS data on usual earnings in the current job, converted to June 2020 dollars. The
bottom 5% and the top 6% of the distribution are omitted, given that low earnings are winsorized
and high earnings are censored due to top-coding. The 12-month periods to April, May, June, and




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5: Impact of the Pandemic on Year-Over-Year Percentage Change in Labor
























Note: PUA = Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (eligibility expansion), PUC = Pandemic Unem-
ployment Compensation (additional $600 per week). This graph plots the estimated coefficients and
95% confidence intervals for the impact of the pandemic on the year-over-year percentage change in
real weekly earnings among previously employed individuals based on the estimation of Equation (1).
The earnings measures are: (1) actual earned wages (including zeros), (2) wages plus estimated stan-
dard UI benefits, (3) the above plus estimated PUA benefits, (4) the above plus PUC benefits, and (5)
wages plus all benefits, adjusted for the probability of receiving benefits based on our benchmarking
exercise in Section 4.2.
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Wage Changes + Actual UI Payments
Note: PUA = Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (eligibility expansion), PUC = Pandemic Unem-
ployment Compensation (additional $600 per week). The figure plots the estimated coefficients and
95% confidence intervals for the impact of the pandemic throughout the earnings distribution, based
on the estimation of Equation (2) using individual-level data on year-on-year percentage changes in
earnings from January 2015 until July 2020. Each panel uses a different measure of earnings: (1) actual
earned wages (including zeros) plus estimated standard UI benefits, (2) the above plus estimated PUA
benefits, (3) the above plus PUC benefits, and (4) wages plus all benefits, adjusted for the probability
of receiving benefits based on our benchmarking exercise in Section 4.2.
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Pre-Disp. Wage Standard UI
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Note: PUA = Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (eligibility expansion), PUC = Pandemic Unem-
ployment Compensation (additional $600 per week). The top figure shows average real weekly earnings
in 2019 across deciles for all individuals (blue) versus individuals who lost employment during the pan-
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Earnings Increase
Note: The figure plots the estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from Equation (2) using
individual-level data on year-on-year changes in nominal earnings from January 2015 until July 2020.
The panels provide estimates of the impact of the pandemic on the probability of experiencing an
earnings cut, an earnings increase, or no change in earnings, respectively. Earnings cuts and increases
are based on changes of at least $10 in weekly earnings. The sample includes individuals who are
employed in both month-in-sample 4 and month-in-sample 8 (237,838 observations).
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Note: The figure plots the estimated impact of the pandemic (along with 95% confidence intervals)
on the employment rate for different groups of workers. Recently employed are individuals who were
employed at some point in the last three months, while not recently employed are the balance.
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Note: The figure plots the estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals obtained from the
estimation of Equation (1) using the year-on-year job separation rate as the dependent variable.
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Figure A.4: Impact of the Pandemic on Year-Over-Year Dollar Change in Labor Earn-

































Note: PUA = Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (eligibility expansion), PUC = Pandemic Unem-
ployment Compensation (additional $600 per week). This graph plots the estimated coefficients and
95% confidence intervals for the impact of the pandemic on the year-over-year dollar change in real
weekly earnings among previously employed individuals based on the estimation of Equation (1). The
earnings measures are: (1) actual earned wages (including zeros), (2) wages plus estimated standard
UI benefits, (3) the above plus estimated PUA benefits, (4) the above plus PUC benefits, and (5)
wages plus all benefits, adjusted for the probability of receiving benefits based on our benchmarking
exercise in Section 4.2.
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Figure A.5: Distribution of Employment and UI Eligibility Status during the Pandemic
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PUA UI UI Ineligible
Note: PUA = Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (eligibility expansion). This figure shows the
fraction of individuals in each pre-pandemic wage decile that were either: (a) employed during the
pandemic months, (b) eligible for standard UI, (c) eligible only for the CARES PUA UI expansion, or
(d) ineligible for UI. Individual’s UI eligibility status is predicted based on our approach described in
Section 4.1. Note that these are raw shares of individuals, and thus show a larger number of separations
than the estimates in Figure 4, which remove typical transition rates.
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Low Earnings Too few weeks (est.)
Self-Emp All Standard UI Inelg.
CARES Inelg.
Note: This figure shows the fraction of individuals who were employed one year prior and were displaced
during the pandemic but are ineligible for standard UI for one of three reasons: earnings did not pass
the state earnings threshold, weeks of employment did not pass the state threshold (estimated from
ACS data), or the worker was self-employed in his or her most recent month of employment. Note
that all of these workers are eligible for PUA (Pandemic Unemployment Assistance) instead. The grey
bar shows the share that we estimate are ineligible for the PUA provision in the CARES Act because
they were not recent job losers.
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Figure A.7: Impact of the Pandemic on Year-Over-Year Dollar Change in Labor Earn-
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Wage Changes + Actual UI Payments
Note: PUA = Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (eligibility expansion), PUC = Pandemic Unem-
ployment Compensation (additional $600 per week). The figure plots the estimated coefficients and
95% confidence intervals for the impact of the pandemic throughout the earnings distribution, based
on the estimation of Equation (2) using individual-level data on year-on-year dollar changes in earn-
ings from January 2015 until July 2020. Each panel uses a different measure of earnings: (1) actual
earned wages (including zeros) plus estimated standard UI benefits, (2) the above plus estimated PUA
benefits, (3) the above plus PUC benefits, and (4) wages plus all benefits, adjusted for the probability
of receiving benefits based on our benchmarking exercise in Section 4.2.
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Note: This graph plots the share of total benefits paid across standard UI and the CARES Act by
ventile in the pre-displacement wage distribution.
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Table A.1: Characteristics of UI Recipients versus CPS Predicted Recipients
















Transportation and utilities 4% 6%
Information 2% 2%
Financial activities 1% 3%
Professional and business services 4% 9%
Educational and health services 15% 20%
Leisure and hospitality 22% 19%
Other services 5% 8%
Public administration 1% 2%
Note: This table compares the demographic and industry characteristics among predicted UI claimants
from the CPS and actual characteristics of UI recipients reported to the DoL. The data span March
through June 2020.
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